Anti-defection law: Ensuring Stability or Hindering Political Freedom?

By Navya Y.

Imagine forming a team to achieve a common goal. Each member is essential, contributing time, resources, and trust to ensure success. One of your key members suddenly defects to a rival team, driven by personal gain. This betrayal would hamper your efforts and erode trust within your group. A similar scenario unfolds in the political landscape when elected representatives, trusted by voters and backed by political parties, switch sides for personal or political benefits, especially right before election candidates nominations. 

In the political realm, defections are not just an internal setback for a party; they also affect public trust. Voters cast their ballots based on party ideologies and promises. When a representative defects, it undermines the election mandate, creating a sense of betrayal. A recent example of this would be in October 2024 when former BJP leaders in Jharkhand, such as Lois Marandi and Kunal Sarangi, defected to the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, citing dissatisfaction with BJP’s internal politics and allegations of corruption as reasons for their defection. 

To tackle such situations, the Anti-defection law was introduced as a legislative framework to address this issue in 1985. The law aimed to combat instability caused by frequent MLA defections in the political system, undermining the electoral mandate. The main objective behind the law was to ensure the credibility of parliamentary democracy. 

Origin of the Anti-defection law 

‘Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram’, a popular phrase in 1967, came to the limelight when an MLA from Haryana Gaya Lal changed his party thrice on the same day. This incident became symbolic of the rampant defections occurring in Indian politics. The article ‘Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram - The Politics of Defection’ by the Indian Law Institute in 1979 reported that from 1967 to 1969, almost 1500 party defections and 313 independent candidate defections occurred in 12 states. The alarming rise in defections prompted the government to set up a committee under Home Minister Yashwantrao Balwantrao Chavan to assess the problem. 

The Chavan committee later recommended that legislators who change their party for monetary gains should be excluded from the parliament and barred from contesting elections for some time.  In 1985, the anti-defection law, officially known as the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, was introduced through the 52nd Amendment Act. 

At that time, Rajiv Gandhi's government enjoyed a massive majority of 414 out of 533 seats in the Lok Sabha, making it easier to pass the legislation. The law was seen as a crucial step to preventing the party-hopping of politicians, a practice that had significantly destabilised governments, particularly affecting opposition parties.  

Decoding Law: A Critical Analysis 

Since the introduction of the anti-defection law, representatives have been more likely to vote according to their party whip. On the other hand, the law is also criticised for: 

• The violation of Article 19 (1) (a), where MPs and MLAs vote in line with the party’s directives issued by their respective parties, restricts their freedom of speech and expression. 
• Lack of representation of minority views within the political parties:, when representatives do not agree with their party’s agenda, they are forced to vote according to their party whip even if they disagree. 

The existing provision of anti-defection law allows for defection in certain circumstances, such as when a party merges with another party or when a legislator has been expelled from their party. These provisions have been criticised for being too broad and allowing for arbitrary and politically motivated defections. 

What is the way forward? 

The law helps improve the policy outcomes, allowing the legislators to express dissent within the framework of their party.  Defectors are often rewarded with ministerial positions in the new government, thus encouraging unethical defections. In such cases, introducing a provision to bar defectors from holding any ministerial positions for at least three years would act as a deterrent.  

Allowing them to vote independently on policy issues ensures that regional and constituency-specific concerns are adequately represented in legislative debates.  The current law provides ambiguous definitions of what constitutes a voluntary resignation or split, leading to manipulation by legislators. Clearly defining voluntary resignation would help prevent its misuse as a loophole to evade disqualification. 

The anti-defection law plays a pivotal role in maintaining the stability and integrity of India’s political system by preventing the elected representatives from defecting their parties to opposite ones. However, the impact of the law has been undermined by some pitfalls, such as the provisions that allow defections through party mergers and delays in the judicial processes. To strengthen the democratic process, these issues must be addressed through reforms such as stringent rules for party mergers and independent adjudication of defection cases. By closing the gaps, we can ensure that the law serves its intended purpose by reducing opportunism and promoting accountable governance.